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THE	  (DYS)FUNCTIONS	  OF	  AMERICAN	  FEDERALISM	  	  
Lisa	  L.	  Miller	  *	  
SOTIRIOS	  A.	  BARBER,	  THE	  FALLACIES	  OF	  STATES’	  RIGHTS	   (2013).	  Pp.	  256.	  Hardcover	  $39.95.	  	  DAVID	  BRIAN	  ROBERTSON,	  FEDERALISM	  AND	  THE	  MAKING	  OF	  AMERICA	  (2012).	  Pp.	  248.	  Hardcover	  $40.00.	  	  ERIN	  RYAN,	  FEDERALISM	  AND	  THE	  TUG	  OF	  WAR	  WITHIN	   (2011).	  Pp.	  432.	  Hardcover	  $75.00.	  	   Readers	  might	  reasonably	  ask	  what	  three	  more	  books	  on	  American	  federalism	  could	  possibly	  add	  to	  the	  already	  voluminous	  body	  of	  work	  on	  the	  topic.	  This	  thriv-­‐ing	  industry	  has	  recently	  produced	  encyclopedic	  compilations	  of	  major	  writings	  in	  the	  field,1	  works	  that	  laud	  the	  space	  federalism	  carves	  out	  for	  minority	  rule,2	  pieces	  that	   highlight	   the	   liberty-­‐enhancing	   strengths	   of	   interactive,	   multi-­‐level	   govern-­‐ance,3	   and	   even	   a	   full	   frontal	   assault	   on	   the	   very	   idea	   that	   American	   federalism	  serves	  any	  valuable	  democratic	  purpose	  whatsoever.4	  What	  could	  possibly	  be	  add-­‐ed	  to	  this	  vast	  literature?	  Plenty,	   it	  turns	  out.	  The	  main	  reason	  is	  that	  so	  many	  of	  the	  extant	  works	  are	  trapped	  in	  legalistic	  norms	  that	  assume	  American	  federalism’s	  alleged	  virtues	  with	  little	   empirical	   analysis	   of	   how	   federalism	   actually	   structures	   political	   activity	   on	  the	  ground,	  whether	  it	  produces	  the	  ends	  it	  is	  alleged	  to	  encourage,	  or	  even	  wheth-­‐er	  those	  ends	  are,	  in	  fact,	  essential	  to	  the	  advancement	  of	  democratic	  values.5	  What	  
                                                            	   *	   Associate	  Professor	  of	  Political	  Science,	  Rutgers	  University.	  	  	  	   1.	  	   See	  generally	  1	  FEDERALISM	  (John	  Kincaid	  ed.,	  2011)	  (compilation	  of	  various	  articles	  pertaining	  to	  specific	  debates	  and	  perspectives	  on	  federalism);	  FEDERALISM,	  SUBNATIONAL	  CONSTITUTIONS,	  AND	  MINORITY	  RIGHTS	  (G.	  Alan	  Tarr	  et	  al.	  eds.,	  2004)	  (compilation	  of	  various	  essays	  on	  comparative	  constitutionalism	  and	  case	  studies	  regarding	  constitutional	  arrangements	  and	  the	  protection	  of	  minority	  rights	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  the	  connection	  between	  federalism/subnational	  constitutionalism	  and	  minority	  rights).	  	  	  	   2.	  	   E.g.,	  Heather	  K.	  Gerken,	  Foreword:	  Federalism	  All	  the	  Way	  Down,	  124	  HARV.	  L.	  REV.	  4,	  6	  (2010).	  	   3.	  	   E.g.,	  ROBERT	  A.	  SCHAPIRO,	  POLYPHONIC	  FEDERALISM:	  TOWARD	  THE	  PROTECTION	  OF	  FUNDAMENTAL	  RIGHTS	  122	  (2009).	  	  	  	   4.	  	   See	   generally	   MALCOLM	   FEELEY	   &	   EDWARD	   L.	   RUBIN,	   FEDERALISM:	   POLITICAL	   IDENTITY	   AND	   TRAGIC	  COMPROMISE	  (2008).	  	  	   5.	  	   E.g.,	  Robert	  D.	  Cooter	  &	  Neil	  S.	  Siegel,	  Collective	  Action	  Federalism:	  A	  General	  Theory	  of	  Article	   I,	  
Section	  8,	  63	  STAN.	  L.	  REV.	  115,	  118	  (2010);	  Gerken,	  supra	  note	  2,	  at	  8;	  John	  F.	  Manning,	  Federalism	  and	  
the	  Generality	  Problem	  in	  Constitutional	   Interpretation,	  122	  HARV.	  L.	  REV.	  2003,	  2004	  (2009);	   J.	  Mitchell	  Pickerill	  &	  Paul	  Chen,	  Medical	  Marijuana	  Policy	  and	  the	  Virtues	  of	  Federalism,	  38	  PUBLIUS	  22,	  24	  (2007);	  Note,	  Defending	  Federalism:	  Realizing	  Publius’s	  Vision,	  122	  HARV.	  L.	  REV.	  745,	  746-­‐47	  (2008);	  Symposium,	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is	  most	  promising	  about	  these	  three	  volumes	  is	  that	  none	  of	  them	  begins	  with	  the	  premise	   that	   American	   federalism	   is	   necessarily	   a	   laudable	   arrangement.	   Rather,	  each	  seeks	  to	  explore	  the	  nature	  of	  this	  peculiar	  structure	  as	  it	  is,	  and	  assess	  its	  im-­‐pact	   on	  multiple	   goals	   of	   democratic	   governance.	   Such	   analyses	   are	  well	   overdue	  and	  each	  of	   these	  books	  offers	   important	   challenges	   to	  conventional	   tropes	  about	  the	  value	  of	  our	  federal	  system.	  In	   the	   spirit	   of	   these	  works,	   I	   begin	  with	   a	   candid	   statement	  of	  my	  own	  ap-­‐proach	  to	  understanding	  American	  federalism.	  For	  all	  the	  literature,	  it	  is	  surprising	  how	   few	   legal	   analyses	   have	   taken	   up	   the	   call,	   issued	   decades	   ago,	   to	   gain	  more	  conceptual	  clarity	  as	  to	  the	  specific	  values	  that	   inhere	  in	  American	  federalism	  and	  to	   generate	  more	   systematic	   assessments	   of	   whether	   it	   actually	   produces	   any	   of	  them.6	   Indeed,	   most	   approaches	   are	   deeply	   attached	   to	   the	   idea	   that	   federalism	  must	   have	   some	  virtues,	   and	   then	   set	   out	   to	   identify	   them.7	   Thus,	  my	   orientation	  towards	  the	  three	  volumes	  under	  review	  here	  is	  to	  consider	  what	  they	  contribute	  to	  our	  understanding	  of	  American	  federalism	  de	  facto,	  rather	  than	  their	  contributions	  to	  de	  jure	  preferences.	  In	  this	  view,	  new	  work	  on	  American	  federalism	  should	  rec-­‐ognize	   it	   as	   a	  political	   institution	  and	   seek	   to	  understand	   it	  better	  as	   such,	   rather	  than	  (or	  at	   least	   in	  conjunction	  with)	  articulating	  how	  we	  might	   like	   it	   to	  be.	  Con-­‐temporary	  analyses,	  in	  other	  words,	  are	  particularly	  beneficial	  when	  they	  move	  be-­‐yond	   the	   stale	   reifying	  of	   “our	   federalism”	   and	   towards	   an	   engagement	  with	  how	  federalism	  functions	  as	  a	  political	  institution	  that	  structures	  power	  relations.8	  Happily,	   all	   of	   these	   books	   move	   the	   literature	   in	   that	   direction,	   albeit	   to	  greater	  or	   lesser	  degrees.	  Each	   is	  rich	  with	  detail,	   though	  space	  does	  not	  permit	  a	  comprehensive	  summary	  of	  all	  dimensions.	  Rather,	  I	  will	  offer	  brief	  reviews	  of	  the	  main	  arguments	  and	  then	  discuss	  them	  further	  through	  the	  thematic	  lens	  of	  distin-­‐guishing	  federalism’s	  normatively	  framed	  virtues	  from	  its	  reality.	  The	  brevity	  of	  the	  summaries	   should	  not	  be	   taken	  as	  encompassing	   the	  nuance	  and	  complexity	  pro-­‐vided	  in	  each	  volume.	  Erin	   Ryan’s,	   Federalism	   and	   the	   Tug	   of	  War	  Within,	   offers	   a	   comprehensive	  analysis	  of	   legal	  cases	  from	  cooperative	  federalism	  to	  New	  Federalism,	   illustrating	  
                                                                                                                                                    
Federalism,	  Political	  Accountability,	  and	  the	  Spending	  Clause,	  107	  HARV.	  L.	  REV.	  1419,	  1420-­‐21	  (1994).	  	  	   6.	  	   E.g.,	  WILLIAM	   H.	   RIKER,	   FEDERALISM:	   ORIGIN,	   OPERATION,	   SIGNIFICANCE	   138	   (1964);	   Barry	   Friedman,	  
Valuing	  Federalism,	  82	  MINN.	  L.	  REV.	  317,	  319	  (1997);	  Larry	  Kramer,	  Understanding	  Federalism,	  47	  VAND.	  L.	  REV.	  1485,	  1486-­‐87	  (1994).	  	   7.	  	   E.g.,	  Friedman,	  supra	  note	  6,	  at	  322	  (though	  he	  calls	   into	  question	  the	  alleged	  virtues	  of	  federal-­‐ism,	   he	   nonetheless	   begins	   from	   the	   premise	   that	   we	   should	   value	   federalism,	   suggesting	   that	   “legal	  scholars	  of	  federalism	  join	  together	  with	  those	  in	  other	  disciplines	  to	  enhance	  our	  knowledge	  of	  the	  val-­‐ues	  of	  federalism.”).	  	  	   8.	  	   Although attributed to language in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971), the term “our federalism” 
is frequently associated with the virtues outlined by Sandra Day O’Connor in Gregory v. Ashcroft. See Gregory 
v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991). The Gregory Court noted: 
[The] federalist structure of joint sovereigns preserves to the people numerous ad-
vantages. It assures a decentralized government that will be more sensitive to the diverse 
needs of a heterogeneous society; it increases opportunity for citizen involvement in the 
democratic processes; it allows for more innovation and experimentation in government; 
and it makes government more responsive by putting the States in competition for a mo-
bile citizenry. . . . Perhaps the principle benefit of the federalist system is a check on 
abuses of government power.	  
Id.	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the	   contradictions	   and	   tensions	   inherent	   in	   trying	   to	   shoehorn	   all	   of	   federalism’s	  virtues	  into	  legal	  opinions	  addressing	  very	  specific	  political	  problems.9	  Articulating	  the	  key	  political	  commodities	  that	  federalism	  purportedly	  offers—checks	  on	  sover-­‐eign	   authority	   to	   safeguard	   individuals,	   accountability	   and	   democratic	   participa-­‐tion,	   local	   autonomy	   (innovation,	   diversity,	   competition),	   subsidiarity,	   and	   state-­‐federal	  problem-­‐solving—Ryan	  nicely	  illustrates	  that,	  not	  only	  is	  it	  unclear	  whether	  Americans	  actually	  value	  all	  of	  these	  equally,	  but	  even	  if	  they	  do,	  they	  often	  run	  into	  conflict	  with	  one	  another.10	  As	  a	  result,	  Ryan	  argues,	  federal	  courts	  are	  by	  necessity	  engaged	   in	  balancing	   these	  goals,	  whether	  or	  not	   they	  acknowledge	  doing	  so,	  and	  Ryan’s	  aim	   is	   to	  bring	   this	  balancing	  more	   to	   the	   fore	  of	  constitutional	   logics.11	   In	  place	   of	   the	   ad-­‐hoc	   reasoning	   she	   sees	   in	   current	   state-­‐federal	   conflict	   jurispru-­‐dence,	  Ryan	  offers	  “Balanced	  Federalism,”	  a	  mechanism	  for	  assessing	  federal-­‐state	  relations	  and	  for	  understanding	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Tenth	  Amendment	  in	  contemporary	  American	   jurisprudence.12	   In	  making	   this	  move,	   she	  explicitly	   confronts	   the	  ques-­‐tion	  of	  who	  should	  decide,	  less	  from	  a	  normative	  or	  ideological	  position	  than	  from	  a	  practical,	  empirical	  one.13	  The	  book’s	  greatest	  strength,	  in	  my	  view,	  is	  that	  Ryan	  understands	  and	  takes	  seriously	  the	  way	  that	  much	  public	  policy	  and	  legal	  rules	  are	  actually	  made	  and	  im-­‐plemented	   in	  American	   politics—that	   is,	   through	   untidy	   conflict	   and	   compromise	  that	  draw	  in	  many	  of	  the	  players	  in	  every	  venue,	  from	  national	  to	  state	  and	  even	  to	  local	  actors.14	  Drawing	  on	  rich	  examples	  from	  environmental	  policy,	  land	  use,	  pub-­‐lic	  health,	  and	  counter-­‐terrorism,	  Ryan	  highlights	  the	  real	  challenges	  facing	  twenty-­‐first	   century	   governance	   and	   the	   limited	   capacity	   of	   existing	   federalism	   jurispru-­‐dential	   frameworks	  to	  contribute	  to	  their	  resolution.15	  Ryan	  suggests	  that	  the	  Bal-­‐anced	  Federalism	  framework	  would	  be	  triggered	  when	  clear	  jurisdictional	  bounda-­‐ries	   are	   not	   at	   stake,	   and	   thus	  what	   she	   refers	   to	   as	   “the	   interjurisdictional	   gray	  area”	  is	  in	  play.16	  In	  that	  case,	  she	  argues,	  courts	  should	  consider	  not	  just	  the	  classic,	  unidirectional	  problem	  of	  excessive	  federal	  encroachment	  on	  state	  power,	  but	  also	  the	   reverse	   flow—when	   state	   capacity	   is	   such	   that	   it	   does	   not	   provide	   sufficient	  
                                                            	   9.	  	   ERIN	  RYAN,	  FEDERALISM	  AND	  THE	  TUG	  OF	  WAR	  WITHIN	  xi	  (2011).	  	  	   10.	  	   Id.	  	  	   11.	  	   Id.	  	  	   12.	  	   Id.	  at	  xi-­‐xii.	  	   13.	  	   Id.	  at	  xii.	  	  	   14.	  	   I have referred to this as the “federalization of law and policy.” See Lisa L. Miller, The Representation-
al Biases of Federalism: Scope and Bias in the Political Process, Revisited, 5 PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICS 305-
21 (2007). See also LISA L. MILLER, THE PERILS OF FEDERALISM: RACE, POVERTY, AND THE POLITICS OF 
CRIME CONTROL 5 (2008). Federalization is a term that is likely to confuse legal scholars since, in the legal 
academy, it has primarily been used to describe increasing the scope of national authority in particular policy 
areas. See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of Overcriminalization: From Morals and Mattress Tags to 
Overfederalization, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 747, 766-70 (2005). However, focusing on increases or decreases in 
national or state authority over particular issue areas obscures the fact that jurisdictional authority is not a zero-
sum game because many issues are active on the agendas of national, state, and even local political institutions 
simultaneously (for a related discussion, see Emily Zackin, What’s Happened to American Federalism?, 43 
POLITY 388, 389 (2011)). A more appropriate term for increasing national attention to, or control over, particu-
lar policy areas would be ‘nationalization.’ ‘Federalization’ thus implicitly recognizes increasing attention to 
policy across the varied landscape of American federalism as positive sum.	  	   15.	  	   See	  generally	  RYAN,	  supra	  note	  9.	  	   16.	  	   Id.	  at	  186.	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means	  through	  which	  to	  solve	  the	  underlying	  policy	  problems.17	  In	  Balanced	  Feder-­‐alism,	  courts	  would	  consider	  factors	  such	  as	  whether	  affected	  parties	  had	  (implicit-­‐ly	   or	   explicitly)	  waived	  Tenth	  Amendment	   objections,	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   regulatory	  crossover	   (whether	   it	   is	   temporary,	   for	   example),	   the	   purpose	   and	   effects	   of	   the	  federal-­‐state	  issues	  at	  stake,	  whether	  the	  crossover	  adversely	  affects	  vulnerable	  lo-­‐cal	  actors	  and,	  particularly	  important	  for	  Ryan,	  the	  capacity	  of	  lower	  levels	  of	  gov-­‐ernments	  to	  actually	  solve	  the	  problem	  at	  hand.18	  In	  highlighting	  the	  complex	  web	  of	  policy	  decisions	  and	  implementation	  pro-­‐cesses	  through	  specific	  examples	  such	  as	  Hurricane	  Katrina	  and	  radioactive	  waste	  disposal,	  Ryan	  rightly	  situates	  federalism	  conflicts	  in	  the	  context	  of	  real	  world	  poli-­‐cy-­‐making.	   She	   thus	   avoids	   the	   tempting	   illusion	   that	   contemporary	   social	   prob-­‐lems	   could	  mystically	   recede	   into	   the	   background,	   if	   only	   states	   and	   the	   national	  government	  would	  reach	  whatever	  optimal	  jurisdictional	  boundary	  is	  preferred	  by	  various	  factions	  in	  the	  federalism	  wars.	  Ryan’s	  willingness	  to	  engage	  with	  the	  reali-­‐ties	  of	  here	  and	  now	  is	  both	  refreshing	  and	  illuminating.	  Though	  Ryan	  is	  critical	  of	  many	  Tenth	  Amendment	  claims	  for	  their	  inability	  to	  produce	   a	   logic	   that	   can	   confront	   twenty-­‐first	   century	   problems,	   she	   nonetheless	  articulates	  a	  robust	  defense	  of	  its	  continued	  role	  in	  constitutional	  jurisprudence.	  In	  
The	   Fallacies	   of	   States’	   Rights,	   Sotirios	   Barber	   gives	   no	   such	   quarter	   to	   the	   long-­‐suffering	  Amendment.	  Going	  well	  beyond	  Ryan,	  Barber	  denies	  any	  constitutionally	  defensible	  state	  claim	  against	  national	  authority.19	  His	  argument	  pits	  states’	  rights	  claims	  against	  two	  forms	  of	  national	  federalism:	  process	  federalism	  and	  Marshalli-­‐an	   federalism.20	  Process	   federalism	  asserts	   that	  so	   long	  as	  state	  concerns	  are	  pro-­‐tected	  in	  the	  democratic	  process—through	  equal	  representation	  in	  the	  Senate,	  fair	  elections	   in	   state	   legislatures	   and	   so	   on—the	   outcome	   of	   any	   national	   legislative	  process	  is	  justified.21	  Barber	  is	  unhappy	  with	  this	  approach	  because	  it	  assumes	  that	  simply	   aggregating	   individual	   preferences	   can	   produce	   the	   kind	   of	   robust,	   civic-­‐minded	  republic	   that	   the	  Framers	   intended.22	  His	  alternative,	  Marshallian	   federal-­‐ism,	  promotes	  a	  “secular	  public	  reasonableness,”	  which	  Barber	  argues	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  history	  and	  intent	  of	  the	  founding	  of	  the	  nation:23	  	  	   If	  the	  national	  government	  is	  trying	  to	  secure	  the	  nation	  from	  for-­‐eign	   attack,	   or	   trying	   to	   promote	   job	   growth,	   or	   trying	   to	   ensure	  equal	   treatment	   and	   opportunity	   for	   the	   nation’s	   people—if	   the	  government	  is	  pursuing	  ends	  that	  a	  reasonable	  reading	  of	  the	  Con-­‐stitution	   authorizes—then	   clashes	   with	   the	   states	   are	   constitu-­‐tionally	  irrelevant.24	  
                                                            	   17.	   Id.	  	  	   18.	  	   Id.	  	  	   19.	  	   SOTIRIOS	  A.	  BARBER,	  THE	  FALLACIES	  OF	  STATES’	  RIGHTS	  2	  (2013).	  	   20.	  	   Id.	  at	  8.	  	   21.	  	   Id.	  	  	   22.	  	   Id.	  at	  18-­‐19.	  	   23.	  	   Id.	  at	  87.	  	  	   24.	  	   Id.	  at	  5.	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  In	   articulating	  Marshallian	   federalism,	   Barber	   continues	   his	   argument	   for	   a	  positive	   or	   ends-­‐oriented	   constitutionalism.25	   Marshallian	   federalism	   would	   give	  courts	   one	   simple	   question	   to	   answer	   in	   federalism	   conflicts:	   Is	   the	  national	   gov-­‐ernment	  doing	  what	  it	  is	  supposed	  to	  do?	  Where	  the	  national	  government	  seeks	  to	  promote	   security,	   prosperity,	   rational	   deliberation,	   and	   public	   debate,	   Congress	  should	   enjoy	   unfettered	   authority.	   Only	  when	   it	   seeks	   alternative	   goals	   could	   the	  courts	   lawfully	  step	   in.	  Though	  Marshallian	  federalism	  includes	  a	  strict	  no-­‐pretext	  rule	  that	  would	  bar	  Congress	   from	  engaging	   in	   lawmaking	   intended	  for	  some	  out-­‐come	  other	  than	  promoting	  the	  nation’s	  prosperity	  or	  security,	  this	  does	  not,	  Barber	  argues,	   stem	   from	   the	   right	   of	   states	   to	   object	   to	   congressional	   action	  but,	   rather	  from	  the	  limitations	  on	  Congress	  itself.26	  Barber	   is	  persuasive	   in	  dismantling	   the	   states’	   rights	  doctrine,	  which,	  he	  ar-­‐gues,	   operates	   with	   a	   logical	   fallacy:	   the	   appeal	   to	   any	   republican	   principle	   that	  claims	  to	  provide	  the	  states	  with	  rights	  that	  they	  can	  assert	  against	  national	  power	  will	  necessarily	   implicate	   the	  sort	  of	  national	  agreement	  on	  what	   those	   rights	  are	  that	   is	  precluded	  by	  the	  very	  specific	  (and	  often	  parochial)	  claims	  made	  by	  states’	  rights	  advocates	  in	  the	  first	  place.27	  In	  trying	  to	  appeal	  to	  some	  value	  of	  state	  sover-­‐eignty	  against	  national	  power,	  Barber	  argues,	  states’	  rights	  advocates	  require	  an	  ar-­‐ticulation	  of	  what	  that	  value	  is.28	  But	  in	  order	  to	  be	  persuasive,	  it	  must	  be	  of	  nation-­‐al	   value,	   thus	   undercutting	   the	   claim	   that	   states	   have	   rights	   against	   national	  authority.29	   Barber’s	   compelling	   rebuttal	   to	   those	  who	  worry	   that	   the	   inability	   of	  states	  to	  make	  a	  legal	  claim	  against	  national	  authority	  would	  result	  in	  congressional	  power	   run	   amok	   is	   simple:	   just	   because	   Congress	   is	  permitted	   to	   act	   in	   a	   certain	  realm	  does	  not	  mean	   it	  necessarily	  will	   act.30	  Nor	  can	  states’	   righters	  explain	  why	  the	  mere	  possibility	  of	  more	  national	  regulation	  is	  a	  threat	  to	  liberty	  but	  more	  “ac-­‐
tual	   regulation”—a	   consequence	   of	  multiple	   lawmaking	   in	  multiple	   state	   govern-­‐ments—is	  not.31	  These	  are	  crucial	  points	  and,	  like	  Ryan,	  they	  illustrate	  Barber’s	  en-­‐gagement	   with	   real-­‐world	   political	   incentives	   that	   drive	   elected	   officials	   and	  government	  agencies.	  While	  Ryan	  and	  Barber	  stake	  out	  normative	  terrain,	  albeit	  with	  a	  clear	  eye	  on	  the	   realities	   of	   twenty-­‐first	   century	   governance,	   in	   Federalism	   and	   the	   Making	   of	  
America,	  David	  Brian	  Robertson	   continues	  his	   analytic	  work	  on	   the	  origins	  of	   the	  American	  Constitution	  that	  places	  interests,	  bargaining,	  and	  politics	  at	  its	  core.32	  A	  scholar	  of	  American	  political	  development,	  Robertson	  persuasively	  illustrates	  how	  American	   federalism	  has	  been	  a	   “principal	  battlefield	  of	  political	   conflict”	  and	  has	  
                                                            	   25.	   SOTIRIOS	   A.	   BARBER	   &	   JAMES	   E.	   FLEMING,	   CONSTITUTIONAL	   INTERPRETATION:	   THE	   BASIC	   QUESTIONS	   16	  (2007).	  	   26.	   BARBER,	  supra	  note	  19,	  at	  205.	  	  
	   27.	   Id.	  at	  9-­‐11.	  	  
	   28.	   Id.	  at	  9.	  	  	   29.	  	   Id.	  	  	   30.	  	   Id.	  at	  62.	  	  	   31.	  	   Id.	  at	  9-­‐10.	  
	   32.	   See	  generally	  DAVID	  BRIAN	  ROBERTSON,	  FEDERALISM	  AND	  THE	  MAKING	  OF	  AMERICA	  (2012).	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played	  a	  role	  in	  virtually	  every	  major	  conflict	  in	  American	  politics.33	  Rather	  than	  cri-­‐tique	  or	   laud	   this	   fact,	  Robertson’s	  aim	   is	   simply	   to	   illustrate	  how,	  and	  with	  what	  consequences,	  this	  has	  occurred.	  After	  spelling	  out	  the	  purported	  virtues	  of	  federal-­‐ism,	   Robertson	   proceeds	   to	   take	   the	   reader	   through	   a	   history	   of	   the	   institution,	  which	   reveals	   just	   how	  disconnected	   such	   values	   are	   from	  practical	   realities.	   “No	  one	  at	  the	  Constitutional	  Convention	  of	  1787,”	  he	  writes,	  “fully	  anticipated	  or	  wel-­‐comed	  the	  federal	  framework	  they	  placed	  in	  the	  U.S.	  Constitution.	  The	  specific	  rules	  of	  American	  federalism	  in	  that	  document	  resulted	  from	  the	  delegates’	  conflicts	  over	  the	  direction	  of	  American	  political	  development.”34	  Indeed,	   the	   second	   chapter	   clearly	   demonstrates	   that	   the	   federal	   structure	  that	  the	  Constitutional	  Convention	  wrought	  was	  not	  an	  idealized	  balance	  of	  power	  aimed	  at	  abstract	  goals,	  such	  as	  liberty	  or	  checks	  and	  balances	  or	  citizen	  participa-­‐tion,	   but	   simply	   the	   best	   the	   Framers	   could	   do,	   given	   the	   conflicts	   and	   interests	   of	  
their	   time.35	   Robertson	   deftly	   illustrates	   the	   path	   dependence	   of	   how	   the	   federal	  structure	   emerged.	   For	   example,	  when	   proportional	   representation	   in	   the	   Senate	  slipped	  away,	  southern	  state	  support	  for	  broad	  national	  powers	  waned.36	  “Because	  a	  series	  of	  ingenious	  and	  expedient	  compromises	  produced	  American	  federalism,	  it	  is	  futile	  to	  try	  to	  find	  a	  single,	  logical	  blueprint	  for	  federalism	  in	  the	  Convention	  de-­‐bates	  or	  the	  Constitution.”37	  Of	  course,	  Robertson	  is	  not	  the	  first	  to	  understand	  the	  Framers	  as	  political	  ac-­‐tors	  with	  political	  interests,	  a	  fact	  historians	  have	  long	  well-­‐understood.38	  What	  he	  adds,	   however,	   is	   detailed	   analysis	   of	   how	   these	   arrangements	   have	   necessarily	  shaped	  the	  development	  of	  political	   institutions,	   the	  tactics	  of	   those	  seeking	  to	   in-­‐fluence	  political	  outcomes,	  as	  well	  as	   the	  outcomes	  themselves.	  The	  book’s	  subse-­‐quent	  chapters	  illustrate	  how	  the	  hardware	  of	  governing—political	  parties,	  interest	  groups,	   social	   movement,	   government	   capacity	   and	   bureaucratic	   regulation—has	  all	  been	  shaped	  by	  the	  federal	  compromise	  forged	  in	  the	  Constitution,	  as	  has	  virtu-­‐ally	   every	   major	   policy	   issue,	   including	   racial	   inequality,	   economic	   development,	  labor-­‐business	  relations	  and	  social	  welfare	  policy.39	  For	  example,	  Robertson	  argues	  that	  federal	  arrangements	  have	  probably	  both	  helped	  and	  hindered	  the	  influence	  of	  business	  interests	  over	  public	  policy.40	  They	  have	  helped	  in	  that	  the	  fragmented	  na-­‐ture	  of	  power	  in	  the	  U.S.	  federal	  system	  allowed	  those	  opposed	  to	  government	  regu-­‐lation	   to	   “dig	   in	  behind	  states’	   rights,”	  but	   they	  also	  generated	  a	   larger	  number	  of	  venues	  where	  various	   social	  movements	   could	  press	   for	   inflexible	   rules	   to	  be	   im-­‐
                                                            
	   33.	   Id.	  at	  1.	  	  
	   34.	  	   Id.	  at	  19.	  	  	   35.	  	   Id.	  at	  34-­‐35.	  	  	   36.	  	   Id.	  at	  26-­‐27.	  	  	   37.	  	   Id.	  at	  31.	  	   38.	  	   See	   generally	   RICHARD	   BEEMAN,	   PLAIN,	   HONEST	   MEN:	   THE	   MAKING	   OF	   THE	   AMERICAN	   CONSTITUTION	  (2009);	   PAUL	   FINKELMAN,	   SLAVERY	   AND	   THE	   FOUNDERS:	   RACE	   AND	   LIBERTY	   IN	   THE	   AGE	   OF	   JEFFERSON	   (2d	   ed.	  2001);	  GEORGE	  WILLIAM	  VAN	  CLEVE,	  A	  SLAVEHOLDERS’	  UNION:	  SLAVERY,	  POLITICS,	  AND	  THE	  CONSTITUTION	  IN	  THE	  EARLY	  AMERICAN	  REPUBLIC	  (2010).	  	   39.	   ROBERTSON,	  supra	  note	  32,	  at	  1.	  	  
	   40.	   Id.	  at	  50-­‐51.	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posed	  on	  what	  they	  saw	  as	  deeply	  hostile	  adversaries.41	  Perhaps	  Robertson’s	  most	  important	  contribution	  is	  his	  exploration	  of	  feder-­‐alism	   as	   a	   “double	   battleground,”	  which	   gives	   “political	   adversaries	   the	   incentive	  and	  the	  opportunity	  to	  use	  the	  Constitution	  as	  a	  shield	  and	  a	  sword.”42	  The	  first	  bat-­‐tleground	  is	  the	  one	  on	  which	  all	  democratic	  systems	  turn—should	  the	  government	  act	  and,	  if	  so,	  by	  what	  means?	  But	  the	  second	  battleground	  is	  which	  level	  of	  govern-­‐
ment	  should	  have	  the	  power	  to	  act,	  and	  it	   is	  this	  second	  alternative,	  Robertson	  ar-­‐gues,	   that	   has	   had	   far-­‐reaching	   implications	   for	   policy.	   “American	   political	   oppo-­‐nents,”	  he	  observes,	   “routinely	   choose	   to	   fight	  on	   the	   second	  of	   these	  battlefields,	  over	  the	  role	  of	  the	  states	  versus	  the	  national	  government,	  because	  they	  are	  likely	  to	  
get	  better	  results	  at	  one	  level	  of	  government	  than	  the	  other.”43	  The	  most	  insidious	  use	  of	  the	  double-­‐battleground	  has	  been	  on	  racial	   inequality,	  which	  slowed	  racial	  pro-­‐gress	   immeasurably.	   But	   other	   illustrations	   abound.	   Liberals	   pushed	   hard	   for	   na-­‐tional	  control	  over	  environmental	  regulation	  during	   the	  period	  of	  government	  ex-­‐pansion	   and	  Democratic	   control	   in	   the	  1960s	   and	  1970s,	   but	   later,	   as	  Republican	  presidents	   cut	   funding	   and	   altered	   national	   policy,	   environmentalists	   sought	   to	  strengthen	  state	  power	  in	  this	  area.44	  Similarly,	  conservative	  opponents	  of	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  and	  abortion	  decried	  federal	  meddling	  when	  it	  protected	  these	  outcomes,	  but	  eagerly	  sought	  national	  laws	  that	  would	  restrict	  them	  (Defense	  of	  Marriage	  Act;	  Partial-­‐Birth	  Abortion	  Ban	  Act).45	  Meanwhile,	  advocates	  of	  medical	  marijuana	  sued	  to	  declare	  federal	  drug	  laws	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  congressional	  power	  when	  states	  began	  to	  legalize	  its	  use.46	  Each	  of	   these	  books	  substantially	  moves	   the	  needle	  of	   federalism	  debates	   in	  three	  ways.	  First,	   in	  making	  explicit	  their	  goals	  and	  values,	  the	  authors	  expose	  the	  difficulty	  (if	  not	  impossibility)	  of	  articulating	  federalism’s	  virtues	  without	  tethering	  them	   to	   political	   aims.	   Those	   aims	   need	   not	   be	   strictly	   partisan—the	   problem-­‐solving	   strategy	   proposed	   by	   Ryan,	   for	   example,	   does	   not	   presuppose	   liberal	   or	  conservative	  policy	  solutions—but	  general	  appeals	  to	  the	  traditional	  virtues	  of	  ‘our	  federalism’	  are	  not	  clearly	  self-­‐justifying.	  Second,	  each	  work	  takes	  seriously	  the	  re-­‐alities	  of	  how	  American	   federalism	  functions	  as	  a	  structure	  of	  power	  relations	  by:	  revealing	  how	   federalism	   claims	  have	  been	  used	  by	  different	   groups	   for	   different	  ends	   throughout	   American	   history	   (Robertson),47	   illustrating	   the	   many-­‐layered,	  multiple	  and	  complex	  dynamics	  of	  real	  world	  policy-­‐making	  (Ryan),48	  and	  by	  high-­‐lighting	  the	  political	  aims	  of	  states’	  rights	  claims	  against	  national	  power	  (Barber).49	  
                                                            
	   41.	   Id.	  at	  77.	  
	   42.	   Id.	  at	  34-­‐35.	  	  
	   43.	   Id.	  at	  39	  (emphasis	  added).	  	  	   44.	   See	  BARBER,	  supra	  note	  19,	  at	  22	  (offering	  another	  example,	  arguing	  that	  the	  contemporary	  revival	  of	  states’	  rights	  arguments	  has	  little	  to	  do	  with	  the	  states	  and	  instead,	  is	  primarily	  interested	  in	  subvert-­‐ing	  both	  state	  and	  national	  regulation	  to	  the	  market).	  	   45.	  	   Partial	   Birth	   Abortion	   Ban	   Act,	   18	   U.S.C.A	   §	   1531	   (2003);	   Defense	   of	  Marriage	   Act,	   H.R.	   3396,	  104th	  Cong.	  (1996).	  DOMA	  was	  partially	  declared	  unconstitutional	  by	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  in	  U.S.	  v.	  Wind-­‐
sor,	  570	  U.S.	  ___	  (2013).	  	   46.	   See	  Gonzalez	  v.	  Raich,	  545	  U.S.	  1,	  1	  (2005).	  	   47.	  	   See	  generally	  ROBERTSON,	  supra	  note	  32.	  	   48.	  	   See	  generally	  RYAN,	  supra	  note	  9.	  	   49.	  	   See	  generally	  BARBER,	  supra	  note	  19.	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Finally,	  in	  general,	  these	  books	  focus	  less	  on	  abstract	  and	  ambiguous	  concepts	  like	  ‘liberty’	   and	   ‘checks	   and	   balances,’	   and	  more	   on	   the	   need	   for	   democratic	   govern-­‐ments	   to	   solve	   real	   problems.	   “No	   sane	   actor,”	   Barber	   notes,	   “would	  make	   a	   gov-­‐ernment,	  a	  machine,	  or	  anything	  else	  for	  the	  sole	  or	  the	  chief	  purpose	  of	  restraining	  its	  operation	  or	  use.”50	  Some	  will	  quarrel	  with	  this	  reality-­‐based	  approach,	  arguing	  that	  the	  very	  pur-­‐pose	  and	  value	  of	  American	  federalism	  is	  precisely	  to	  keep	  the	  central	  government	  from	  trying	   to	  solve	  every	  problem	  and	   that	   the	  overlapping,	  messy	   jurisdictional	  terrain	  whose	  origins	  are	  described	  by	  Robertson,	  illustrated	  by	  Ryan	  and	  implicitly	  decried	  by	  Barber	  are	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  very	  congressional	  overreach	  they	  wish	  to	  restrain.	   In	  this	  view,	   it	   is	   the	  encroachment	  on	  state	  power	  that	  has	  generated	  the	  policy	  messes	  we	  are	  in.51	  But	  even	  if	  one	  wishes	  for	  a	  leaner	  regulatory	  role	  for	  the	  national	  government,	  we	  still	  need	  accounts	  of	  how	  to	  get	  there	  from	  here.	  The	  complex	  overlap	  in	  policy-­‐making	  and	  implementation	  is	  a	  ship	  that	  has	  long	  since	  sailed	  and	  no	  one	  can	  credibly	  advocate	  more	  restrictive	  jurisdictional	  boundaries	  without	  explicit	  engagement	  with	  this	  overlap.52	  The	   following	  comments	   link	  up	  with	   the	   ‘federalism	  as	   it	   is’	  aspect	  of	   these	  works	  and	  are	  primarily	  aimed	  at	  moving	  the	  dialogue	  yet	  further	  down	  that	  path,	  as	  well	  as	  highlighting	  some	  of	   the	  ways	   that	   these	  works,	  highly	  valuable	   though	  they	  are,	  may	  still	  include	  some	  obstacles	  to	  doing	  so.	  For	  example,	  though	  engaging	  with	  the	  real	  politics	  of	  having	  to	  govern,	  Ryan	  and	  Barber	  remain	  mired	  in	  case	  law	  as	  justification	  for	  a	  particular	  version	  of	  federalism.53	  In	  doing	  so,	  they	  leave	  them-­‐selves	  open	  to	  opposing	  arguments	  for	  which,	  by	  their	  own	  assessments,	  there	  are	  few,	   if	   any,	   legal	   resolutions.	   To	   be	   clear,	   both	   authors	   are	   explicit	   in	   their	   goals,	  with	  Ryan	  aiming	  at	  providing	  a	  workable	  jurisprudential	  framework	  for	  resolving	  federal-­‐state	  conflicts,	  and	  Barber	  making	  the	  case	  for	  a	  national	  federalism	  that	  is	  capable	  of	  providing	  the	  government	  with	  the	  capacity	  to	  secure	  the	  public	  good.54	  Even	  those	  who	  disagree	  with	  Ryan	  and	  Barber’s	  arguments	  must	  acknowledge	  that	  these	  are	  reasonable	  goals	  of	  democratic	  governance.	  Nonetheless,	  by	  relying	  heavi-­‐ly	  on	  legal	  cases	  and	  constitutional	  logics,	  neither	  volume	  can	  get	  out	  of	  the	  norma-­‐tive	  framework	  on	  which	  opposing	  arguments	  also	  rely.	  For	  example,	  though	  Ryan	  rightfully	  calls	  into	  question	  the	  purpose	  and	  value	  of	  federalism’s	  claimed	  virtues,	  she	  nonetheless	  reifies	  them	  by	  regularly	  deploying,	  but	  not	  defining	  or	  defending,	  abstract	  claims	  of	  “checks	  and	  balances”55	  and	  “pro-­‐tecting	   individual	   rights	   against	   government	   overreach.”56	   While	   she	   does	  acknowledge	  the	  partisan	  nature	  of	  such	  claims,	  subsequent	  arguments	  fall	  back	  to	  purely	  legal	  assessments.57	  At	  one	  point	  she	  suggests	  that:	  
                                                            	   50.	   Id.	  at	  177.	  	  	   51.	  	   See	   generally	  RANDY	   E.	   BARNETT,	   RESTORING	   THE	   LOST	   CONSTITUTION:	   THE	   PRESUMPTION	   OF	   LIBERTY	  (2004);	  RICHARD	  A.	  EPSTEIN,	  HOW	  PROGRESSIVES	  REWROTE	  THE	  CONSTITUTION	  (2006).	  	   52.	   See	  generally	  MICHAEL	  S.	  GREVE,	  THE	  UPSIDE-­‐DOWN	  CONSTITUTION	  (2012).	  	  	   53.	  	   See	  generally	  BARBER,	  supra	  note	  19;	  RYAN,	  supra	  note	  9.	  	   54.	  	   See	  generally	  BARBER,	  supra	  note	  19;	  RYAN,	  supra	  note	  9.	  	   55.	  	   RYAN,	  supra	  note	  9,	  at	  39,	  41,	  61.	  	   56.	  	   Id.	  at	  39.	  	   57.	  	   Id.	  at	  38.	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   If	  infallible	  lines	  of	  governmental	  accountability	  were	  the	  most	  im-­‐portant	  feature	  of	  good	  governance,	  then	  a	  unitary	  or	  even	  a	  con-­‐federate	  system	  might	  be	  preferable.	   .	   .	   .	  And	  yet	  we	  tolerate	  dual	  sovereignty’s	  assault	  on	  this	  particular	  strain	  of	  governmental	  ac-­‐countability	   because	   the	   unitary	   and	   confederate	   alternatives	  would	   undermine	   (inter	   alia)	   the	   check-­‐and-­‐balance	   advantages	  discussed	   above	   and	   the	   problem-­‐solving	   advantages	   discussed	  below.58	  	  But	  Ryan	  never	  explains	  what	  precise	  checks-­‐and-­‐balances	  our	  federal	  system	  provides	   that	   are	  missing	   in,	   say,	   unitary	   systems	   such	  as	   the	  United	  Kingdom	  or	  the	  Netherlands,	  nor	  does	  she	  make	  the	  case	  for	  why	  federalism	  rather	  than	  simply	  decentralization	  is	  required	  to	  solve	  the	  problems	  she	  describes.59	  Most	  strikingly,	  her	  claim	  that	  Americans	  accept	  dual	  sovereignty	   in	  order	  to	  preserve	  checks	  and	  balances	   belies	   Robertson’s	   clear	   historical	   evidence	   that	   American	   federalism	   is	  simply	  the	  constitutional	  structure	  we	  have.	  Similarly,	  while	  Barber	  generously	  lays	  out	  competing	  arguments	  to	  his	  own,	  allowing	  the	  reader	  to	  make	  up	  his	  or	  her	  own	  mind,	  Barber	  himself	  acknowledges	  that	   the	   line	  between	  process	   federalism	  and	  Marshallian	   federalism	  is	  difficult	   to	  draw.60	  His	  argument	  obligates	  him	  to	  defend	  Marshall	  against	  Marshall,61	  further-­‐ing	  the	  reliance	  on	  judicial	  opinions	  to	  validate	  the	  argument	  for	  Marshallian	  feder-­‐alism.	  To	  some	  degree	  then,	  both	  Ryan	  and	  Barber	  elide	  the	  core	  question	  they	  wish	  to	   resolve:	   the	   very	   problem	  of	   just	   how	   the	  national	   and	   state	   balance	   of	   power	  should	  be	  determined.	  Both	  see	  problem-­‐solving	  at	  the	  core,62	  but	  Robertson	  pow-­‐erfully	  illustrates	  that	  the	  meaning	  of	  problem-­‐solving	  itself	  is	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  demo-­‐cratic	   contestation.63	   American	   federalism	   affords	   political	   actors	   the	   opportunity	  not	  only	  to	  decide	  whether	  to	  see	  issues	  as	  problems	  government	  should	  solve	  (e.g.,	  racial	  or	  economic	  inequality)	  or	  even	  as	  problems	  in	  the	  first	  place	  (e.g.,	  lack	  of	  af-­‐fordable	  health	  care),	  but	  also	  to	  then	  obfuscate	  the	  debate	  by	  replacing	  ‘whether	  to	  problem-­‐solve’	  with	  arguments	  of	  where	  to	  do	  so.	  By	  providing	  the	  opportunity	  for	  this	  seemingly	  procedural	  claim,	   federalism	  offers	  a	  bait-­‐and-­‐switch	  political	  com-­‐modity	  that	  has	  allowed	  opponents	  of	  one	  particular	  policy	  or	  another	  to	  	  shift	  the	  argument	  away	  from	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  problem	  and	  what	  the	  government	  should	  do	  about	  it,	  to	  whether	  the	  issue	  should	  be	  resolved	  by	  this	  or	  that	  level	  of	  government.	  	  Indeed,	  Robertson’s	  analysis	  makes	  it	  clear	  that,	  precisely	  because	  federalism	  
                                                            	   58.	  	   Id.	  at	  48.	  	  	   59.	  	   See	  generally	  FEELEY	  &	  RUBIN,	  supra	  note	  4.	  	   60.	  	   See	  BARBER,	  supra	  note	  19,	  at	  172-­‐211.	  	   61.	  	   See	  Gibbons	  v.	  Ogden,	  22	  U.S.	  1	  (1824).	  	   62.	  	   Barber’s	  understanding	  of	  constitutional	  principles	  places	  “secular	  public	  reasonableness”	  at	   its	  core.	  BARBER,	   supra	   note	  19,	   at	  87.	   Similarly,	  Ryan	  notes	   that	   “good	  government	   should	  address	   those	  market	   failures,	   negative	   externalities,	   and	   other	   collective	   action	   problems	   that	   individuals	   are	   ill-­‐equipped	  to	  resolve	  on	  their	  own.”	  RYAN,	  supra	  note	  9,	  at	  5.	  	  	  	   63.	  	   See	  generally	  RYAN,	  supra	  note	  9.	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so	  deeply	  shaped	  the	  institutional	  hardware	  of	  American	  politics,	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  po-­‐litical	  interests,	  motivations	  and	  goals	  are	  obfuscated	  when	  we	  retreat	  to	  legal	  lan-­‐guage	  to	  discuss	  its	  merits.	  Neither	  Ryan	  nor	  Barber’s	  arguments	  can	  get	  us	  out	  of	  this	  double-­‐battleground.	  In	  fact,	  Ryan	  reinforces	  it	  by	  claiming	  that	  there	  are	  ‘clear’	  cases	   of	   federal	   or	   state	   authority	   and	   then	   a	   large,	   inter-­‐jurisdictional	   gray	   area.	  But,	  as	  noted	  above,	  some	  will	  simply	  respond	  to	  this	  gray	  area	  as	  evidence	  of	  the	  very	   unconstitutional	   congressional	   encroachment	   that	   Balanced	   Federalism	   can-­‐not	  resolve.	  Nor	  is	  there	  likely	  to	  be	  much	  agreement	  on	  which	  areas	  fall	  into	  or	  out	  of	  the	  gray.	  Where	  do	  we	  go	  from	  there?	  Even	  Barber,	  who	  makes	  a	  powerful	  case	  for	  why	  states—qua	  states—should	  not	  be	  able	  to	  block	  national	  authority,	  argues	  for	   federal	   courts	   stepping	   in	   to	   restrain	   Congress	   when	   it	   acts	   on	   pre-­‐textual	  grounds,	  thus	  reifying	  the	  use	  of	  double-­‐battlegrounds	  for	  political	  ends	  (surely	  we	  will	  disagree	  as	  to	  what	  counts	  as	  pretext).	  A	   related	  problem	   in	  Ryan’s	  analysis	   is	   the	   tendency	   to	   see	   the	  outcomes	  of	  federalism	  as	  the	  reasons	  we	  require	  federalism.	  Here	  again,	  Robertson	  is	   instruc-­‐tive	  because	  his	  historic	  approach	  illustrates	  how,	  from	  the	  founding	  itself,	  the	  very	  nature	  of	  our	   federal	  system	  generated	  fragmentation,	  de-­‐centralization	  and	  weak	  collective	  action	  across	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  institutions	  and	  actors.	  Thus,	  when	  discuss-­‐ing	  radioactive	  waste,	  Ryan	  notes	  that	  “the	  accumulation	  of	  these	  contaminants	  on	  the	  surface	  of	  private	  and	  state	  lands	  is	  generally	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  federal	  regu-­‐latory	   jurisdiction,”	   and	   thus,	   requires	  multiple,	   overlapping	   levels	  of	   government	  to	   resolve.64	  But	   this	   claim	  overlooks	   the	   fact	   that	   land	  use	  policy	   itself,	   including	  the	  creation	  of	  rivers,	  watersheds	  and	  wetlands,	  has	  long	  been	  a	  function	  of	  political	  struggles	  between	  different	  interests	  using	  federalism’s	  double-­‐battleground	  to	  ad-­‐vance	   their	   preferences.65	   Thus,	   it	   is	   unclear	   why	   the	   radioactive	   waste	   disposal	  story	  that	  Ryan	  draws	  upon	  is	  anything	  more	  than	  a	  coordination	  problem	  that	  has	  actually	   been	   created	   by	   the	   very	   fragmented	   federal	   arrangements	   that	   she	   sug-­‐gests	   are	   required	   to	   solve	   it.	   Drawing	   on	   overlapping	   national-­‐state	   authority	   to	  solve	  problems	  created	  by	  pitched	  battles	  over	  national-­‐state	  authority	  may	  be	  in-­‐evitable,	  but	  it	  hardly	  seems	  fair	  to	  laud	  federalism	  as	  the	  solution	  if	  federalism	  cre-­‐ated	  the	  problem	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  To	   be	   fair,	   the	   target	   audiences	   for	   Ryan	   and	   Barber	   are	   legal	   scholars	   and	  they	  can	  hardly	  make	  their	  case	  without	  venturing	  into	  constitutional	  case	  law	  ter-­‐rain.	   However,	   remaining	   so	   firmly	   planted	   there	   limits	   the	   power	   of	   their	   argu-­‐ments.	  The	   second	   observation	   applies	   to	   all	   three	   works,	   but	   is	   really	   more	   of	   a	  broader	   issue	   in	   the	   legal	   literature	   on	   federalism	   generally,	   which	   is	   that	   few	  works	   leverage	  comparative	  political	  accounts	   to	  any	  substantial	  degree.66	  Admit-­‐tedly,	  this	  is	  even	  less	  fair	  than	  the	  previous	  comment,	  since	  none	  of	  the	  works	  sug-­‐gests	   it	   is	   anything	   other	   than	   analyses	   of	   the	   American	   system	   and	   makes	   no	  
                                                            	   64.	  	   RYAN,	  supra	  note	  9,	  at	  152.	  	  	   65.	  	   See	   generally	   KAREN	   M.	   O’NEILL,	   RIVERS	   BY	   DESIGN:	   STATE	   POWER	   AND	   THE	   ORIGINS	   OF	   U.S.	   FLOOD	  CONTROL	  (2006);	  ROBERTSON,	  supra	  note	  32,	  at	  77.	  	   66.	  	   See	  generally	  BARBER,	  supra	  note	  19;	  ROBERTSON,	  supra	  note	  32;	  RYAN,	  supra	  note	  9.	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broader	  claims	  about	  the	  value	  of	  federalism	  generally.	  However,	  to	  the	  degree	  that	  these	  works	  seek	  to	  offer	  important	  insights	  about	  how	  American	  federalism	  func-­‐tions	  and	  should	  function,	  they	  would	  each	  benefit	  from	  a	  comparative	  framework.	  For	  starters,	  each	  draws	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  American	  federal	  system	  to	  de-­‐fine	   federalism,	   thus	   largely	  mistaking	   the	  American	  case	   for	   the	   form.67	  By	  using	  terms	   like	   ‘divided’	   and	   ‘relationship,’	   they	  obscure	   the	  very	  power	   struggles	   that	  shape	   jurisdictional	   terrain	   in	   the	   first	   place	   (though	   Robertson’s	   book	   clearly	  demonstrates	   these	   struggles).	   The	  more	   analytic	   definition	   used	   by	   comparative	  politics	   scholars	   refers	   to	   “an	   architecture	   of	   government	   with	   dual	   structures,	  driven	  by	  a	  process	  of	  bargaining	  between	  a	  number	  of	  constituent	  units	  and	  a	  cen-­‐ter.”68	  Using	  this	  definition	  re-­‐orients	  legal	  analysis	  by	  placing	  the	  very	  political	  bat-­‐tles	  over	  who	  does	  what	  (bargaining)	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  definition.	  At	  its	  core,	  fed-­‐eralism,	  in	  whatever	  form,	  is	  a	  political	  institution	  that	  structures	  power	  relations.	  The	   American	   federalism	   literature	  would	   benefit	   enormously	   from	   greater	  engagement	  with	  such	  comparative	  work.69	  Contrary	  to	  oft-­‐repeated	  claims	  in	  legal	  literature,	   for	  example,	   comparative	   federalism	  research	   finds	   that	   federalism	  can	  actually	   decrease	   political	   accountability	   and	   public	   responsiveness,	   particularly	  where	  jurisdictional	  boundaries	  lack	  clarity,	  and	  that	  federal	  systems	  likely	  produce	  
fewer	  public	  goods	  than	  unitary	  systems.70	  This	  is	  reinforced	  by	  work	  in	  American	  politics	   that	   finds	   that	   state	   capacity	   for	   innovation	   is	   vastly	   overstated;	   and	   that	  national	  policymaking	  may	  better	  satisfy	  public	  preferences	  than	  sub-­‐national	  poli-­‐cymaking.71	  There	   is	   in	   fact	   little	   evidence	   that	   federalism	  generally	  promotes	  ac-­‐countability,	   innovation,	   participation,	   or	   limits	   government	   abuse,	   and	   even	   less	  evidence	  that	  the	  peculiar	  American-­‐style	  of	  federalism	  specifically	  does	  so.	  Seen	  in	  this	  light,	  Ryan’s	  claim,	  for	  example,	  that	  federal	  preemption	  in	  coun-­‐ter-­‐terrorism	  would	  foreclose	  local	  expertise	  presumes	  aspects	  of	  that	  relationship	  that	  are	  themselves	  open	  for	  bargaining.72	  Why	  does	  federal	  preemption	  necessari-­‐
                                                            	   67.	  	   See	   BARBER,	   supra	   note	  19,	   at	  3	   (explaining	   that	   federalism	   is	   “a	   relationship	  between	   layers	  of	  government”);	   ROBERTSON,	   supra	  note	   32,	   at	   1	   (explaining	   that	   federalism	  means	   “the	   division	   of	   gov-­‐ernment	  authority	  between	  the	  national	  government	  and	  the	  states.”);	  RYAN,	  supra	  note	  9,	  at	  7	  (defining	  federalism	  as	   “a	  system	  of	  government	   in	  which	  power	   is	  divided	  between	  a	  central	  authority	  and	  re-­‐gional	  political	  subunits,	  each	  with	  authority	  to	  directly	  regulate	  its	  citizens.”).	  	  	   68.	  	   Pablo	  Beramendi,	  Federalism,	  in	  THE	  OXFORD	  HANDBOOK	  OF	  COMPARATIVE	  POLITICS	  752,	  754	  (Carles	  Boix	  &	  Susan	  C.	  Stokes	  ed.,	  2009)	  (emphasis	  added).	  	   69.	  	   See	   generally	   Carol	   S.	   Weissert,	   Beyond	   Marble	   Cakes	   and	   Picket	   Fences:	   What	   U.S.	   Federalism	  
Scholars	  Can	  Learn	  from	  Comparative	  Work,	  73	  J.	  POL.	  965,	  974	  (2011).	  	   70.	  	   See	  generally	  CLEM	  BROOKS	  &	  JEFF	  MANZA,	  WHY	  WELFARE	  STATES	  PERSIST:	  THE	  IMPORTANCE	  OF	  PUBLIC	  OPINION	   IN	   DEMOCRACIES	   (2007);	   Cameron	   D.	   Anderson,	   Economic	   Voting	   and	   Multilevel	   Governance:	   A	  
Comparative	  Individual-­‐Level	  Analysis,	  50	  AM.	  J.	  POL.	  SCI.	  449,	  459	  (2006);	  Sandra	  León,	  Who	  is	  Responsible	  
for	  What?	   Clarity	   of	   Responsibilities	   in	  Multilevel	   States:	   The	   Case	   of	   Spain,	   50	   EUR.	   J.	   POL.	   RES.	   80,	   101	  (2010);	  Christopher	  Wlezien	  &	  Stuart	  Soroka,	  Federalism	  and	  Public	  Responsiveness	  to	  Policy,	  41	  PUBLIUS	  31,	  44	  (2010).	  	   71.	  	   See	  Sara	  Chatfield	  &	  Philip	  Rocco,	   Is	   Federalism	  a	  Political	   Safety	  Valve?	  Evidence	   from	  Congres-­‐
sional	  Decision	  Making,	  1960-­‐2005,	  44	  PUBLIUS	  1,	  1	  (2014);	  Virginia	  Gray,	  David	  Lowery,	  James	  Monogan	  &	   Erik	   K.	   Godwin,	   Incrementing	   Toward	   Nowhere:	   Universal	   Health	   Care	   Coverage	   in	   the	   States,	   40	  PUBLIUS	  1,	  82	  (2010);	  David	  Lowery,	  Virginia	  Gray	  &	  Frank	  R.	  Baumgartner,	  Policy	  Attention	  in	  State	  and	  
Nation:	   Is	   Anyone	   Listening	   to	   the	   Laboratories	   of	   Democracy?,	   41	   PUBLIUS	   2,	   286-­‐88	   (2011);	   Ryan	  T.	  Moore	   &	   Christopher	   T.	   Giovinazzo,	   The	   Distortion	   Gap:	   Policymaking	   under	   Federalism	   and	   Interest	  
Group	  Capture,	  42	  PUBLIUS	  2,	  189	  (2012).	  	   72.	  	   See	  RYAN,	  supra	  note	  9,	  at	  159.	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ly	  preclude	   the	  use	  of	   local	   experts?	  This	  blurs	   the	   conceptual	  boundary	  between	  the	  development	  of	  public	  policy	  and	  its	  execution,	  conflating	  the	  necessity	  of	  local	  attention	   to	   policy	   implementation	   with	   the	   necessity	   of	   local	   control	   over	   policy	  
creation.	  Though	  Ryan	  acknowledges	  Rubin	  and	  Feeley’s	  observations	  that	  much	  of	  what	  we	   think	  we	  need	   federalism	   for	  can	  be	  accomplished	   through	  decentraliza-­‐tion,	  she	  nonetheless	  assumes	  that	  problems	   in	  policy	  creation	  require	   federalism	  to	   resolve.73	   However,	   centralized	   political	   systems	   often	   decentralize	   policy	   im-­‐plementation,	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  federalism	  (those	  of	  Germany	  and	  Canada,	  for	  ex-­‐ample)	  have	  a	  fair	  amount	  of	  centralized	  policy	  that	  is	  implemented	  at	  the	  local	  lev-­‐el.	   Even	  Robertson	  modestly	  falls	  prey	  to	  causal	  claims	  of	  American	  federalism’s	  virtuous	   effects.	   After	   adding	   up	   his	   own	   evidence	   that	   federalism	   has	   not	   really	  made	  good	  on	  its	  promises	  of	  protecting	  rights	  and	  liberties,	  responding	  to	  citizens,	  or	  encouraging	  innovation	  and	  efficiency,	  Robertson	  cannot	  resist	  adding	  that	  “fed-­‐eralism	  has	  had	  benefits	   for	   the	  United	  States,	  especially	   for	  democracy	  and	  pros-­‐perity.”74	   He	   goes	   on	   to	   note	   that	   “these	   benefits	  must	   be	  weighed	   against	  many	  costs,”	   but	   given	   his	   analysis,	   one	   wonders	   what	   precise	   democratic	   advantages	  flow	  from	  American	  federalism.75	  These	  books	  each	  make	  a	  crucial	  contribution	  to	  a	  literature	  that	  is	  in	  need	  of	  a	  fresh	  lens.	  They	  challenge	  legal	  claims	  that	  continue	  to	  insist	  that	  preferences	  for	  state	   or	   federal	   jurisdiction	   in	   policymaking	   are	   about	   principles,	   not	   politics,	   by	  engaging	  with	   the	   fact	   that	   governments	   at	   all	   levels	   are	   pressured	   to	   solve	   real	  world	  social	  problems.	   Illuminating	  as	   these	  works	  are	  as	  descriptions	  of	   the	  cur-­‐rent	   realities	   of	   American	   federalism,	   however,	   they	   do	   little	   to	   recommend	   it,	   at	  least	  in	  its	  current	  form.	  Given	  the	  lauding	  of	  American	  federalism	  in	  the	  wider	  legal	  and	  public	  discourses,	  that	  is	  perhaps	  their	  greatest	  strength.	  
                                                            	   73.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  36-­‐38;	  see	  also	  Edward	  L.	  Rubin	  &	  Malcolm	  Feeley,	  Federalism:	  Some	  Notes	  on	  a	  National	  
Neurosis,	  41	  UCLA	  L.	  REV.	  903	  (1994).	  	   74.	  	   ROBERTSON,	  supra	  note	  32,	  at	  176.	  	   75.	  	   Id.	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